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Monthly Archives: October 2015

Monday, October 26, 2015

 

Elecciones Presidenciales ARGENTINAS

BALOTAJE MACRI Presidente

BALOTAJE MACRI VA AL BALOTAJE

 

BALOTAJE MACRI VA AL BALOTAJE

BALOTAJE Scioli y MACRI

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BALOTAJE 15 frases

 

– Alberto Pérez, jefe de gabinete bonaerense“Los datos oficiales que tenemos marcan un contundente triunfo de Daniel Scioli”

– Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, jefe de gobierno porteño electo: “Estamos en el balotaje”

Graciela Camaño, diputada nacional del Frente Renovador“Hemos estado conversando con nuestros dirigentes de todas las provincias y salvo el renuente tema del robo de boletas no hay mayores inconvenientes”

Marcos Peña, secretario general del gobierno porteño“Hay balotaje. Sacamos una distancia menor de lo que fueron las PASO”

Ernesto Sanz, diputado nacional y presidente de la Unión Cívica Radical“Le dimos equilibrio y competencia al sistema democrático”

Diego Bossio, titular de la Ansés“Sacamos más votos que en la Paso”

María Eugenia Vidal, candidata a gobernadora de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (Cambiemos)“Le voy a poner cuerpo y alma para la vida que te merecés, no voy a parar con Mauricio y Gabriela”

 Margarita Stolbizer: “Cumplimos en instalar una referencia ética y progresista”

Alberto Fernández, ex jefe de gabinete de Néstor Kirchner: “Tenemos un escenario complejo por delante, cualquiera sea el ganador de la elección”

Jorge Macri, candidato e intendente de Vicente López“Ahí de dónde es Aníbal, estamos ganando en Quilmes”

Nicolás del Caño, candidato a presidente del FIT“Si hay balotaje, vamos a expresar el pedido de votar en blanco”

Daniel Scioli, candidato a presidente del FpV“Como decía Perón, todos unidos triunfaremos. Creo, además, como decía Alfonsín, que con la democracia se cura, se come y se educa”

Nicolás Del caño, candidato a presidente del FIT“Si hay balotaje, vamos a expresar el pedido de votar en blanco”

Adolfo Rodríguez Saa, candidato a presidente por Compromiso Federal“Este peronismo, el de la Justicia Social, sigue victorioso en San Luis”

Mauricio Macri, candidato a presidente de Cambiemos“Lo que sucedió hoy cambia la política de este país”

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Nota del Editor responsable de este Blog: 

 

Nota del Editor responsable de este Blog: 

 

Soy el Dr. Gastón A Saint Martin MD (Sr.) un mediquito patagónico desconocido; la foto de pantalla con la que “Clarin” me da la bienvenida, la muestro para probar que es la primera vez que me registro (25 de Octubre de 2015).  Después de una ausencia de 10 años, regresé a Argentina (desde Chicago). El día exacto de mi regreso fue el día en que Bergoglio se convirtió en Francisco. Me enteré, en la espera de conexión de vuelos en Miami.  Regresé pre-dispuesto a ver los cambios buenos; a los pesimistas les aseguro que Argentina tiene muchas cosas muy buenas, (es mas fácil verlas desde lejos) pero en conjunto, con una visión general, mi impresión fue ¡horrible!. Este diagnostico no se basó en un análisis apresurado sino en el trabajo sin descanso (mas de 12 horas diarias, (7 x 365) durante mas de año y medio) En mi incredulidad, me pregunté: “Si yo, … que he nacido y crecido aquí, en Argentina, me he han instruido y educado desde una humilde escuela rural (La vieja escuelita “Romagnoli en la ciudad de Roca, RN) a la UNBA, (sin dudas, la mejor Universidad de América Latina …(y ¡GRATUITA!) … no puedo entender lo que aquí está ocurriendo, … ¿como esperar entonces que alguien, desde afuera pueda comprenderlo? …

No soy un cobarde, pero tampoco un irresponsable ni tengo vocación de “suicida”; lo que espontáneamente he hecho(sin planearlo), en ese año y medio es tan … tan ¿..loco … absurdo…? y lleno de sentido comun … que cuando mostré los resultados a alguien de mi confianza me dijo: Gastón, rájate de aquí, si te quedas, y A.F. se entera; vas a durar aun menos que Nisman...”    Así, ya hace casi medio año, regresé a Chicago como refugiado político de incognito! en busca de “praderas mas seguras” … y aquí, … ¿qué encontré? … ¡otra sorpresa! … Contarlo todo me va a llevar “varios capítulos” pero para darles una idea general les digo: “AYER LO CONSIDERE LA FECHA PATRIA MAS IMPORTANTE DE ESTOS ÚLTIMOS 85 AÑOS” así que decidí “no trabajar en todo el día … (…descansar, … ¡para durar!) … Decidimos ir al cine; a mi esposa le gusta Tom Hank; Lake Cinema esta a dos cuadras de casa; así que caminando nos fuimos a la matiné a ver “Bridge of Spies”; fue eso ¿otra casualidad, causalidad, o Dios te envía esas cosas justo en el momento oportuno? … Yo no creo que Dios se meta en pequeñeces, tampoco creo en casualidades, mas sentido común tiene lo que mi amigo Mario R. me comentó en Roca: “causalidades”

A quienes lean esto los desafío a que vean esa película y me digan ¿por qué … me afectó tanto verla, justamente el día DOMINGO 25 de Octubre de 2015, y asociarla a lo que me esta pasando aquí en USA… en estos momentos?

Por favor, difundan esto (y lo que viene)  todo lo que puedan … AHORA … para disminuir riesgos y amenazas a mi persona y a mi familia DEBO SALIR del anonimato

Gastón A. Saint Martin MD

(Alias GAStin, GAStin, PatAgonico, Pata Agonica, y muchos otros sobrenombres que en estos momentos ni me acuerdo)

 

Porque hice lo que hice (solo con sentido común) debí “rajarme de Argentina) para que no me pase lo de Nisman . . .

Lo que hice, tiene tanto sentido común que “LOS PODEROSOS LO RECIBIERON, ENTENDIERON ESTÁN DE ACUERDO y ACTUANDO …

Ahora solo falta que TODOS entendamos que es lo que nos va UNIR a TODOS   ¡OTRA VEZ! Como fue aquella sigla “qsvt” esta SERÁ: QDLR (Que Devuelvan Lo Robado ) así VAMOS A PAGAR LA DEUDA EXTERNA CON DIGNIDAD y sin esclavizar a nuestros HIJOS y NIETOS…

Q.D.L.R.

CLARIN Oct 25 2015

 

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DOMINGO OCTUBRE 25 2015

 ¡85 AÑOS DE ERRORES COMPARTIDOS!

1930 ArgentinA-UsA 2015

25-Oct-15

Argentina puede pagar toda su deuda externa sin gastar ni un solo $ de los impuestos pagados por la gente . . .

Y lo puede hacer dignamente, sin bravuconadas, en forma legal, tal como su Constitución Nacional  lo ordena.

Pagar hasta el ultimo peso … SOBERANAMENTE, con honor, Sin humillarse ni tener que pedir perdón, como dijo dos veces el papa Argentino; sin rencor ni resentimientos por errores del pasado, con la frente alta, orgullosamente! Sin Soberbia pero CON DIGNIDAD!…  

¿COMO?

¡Es TAN Fácil y simple que cuesta para creerlo!

… Entonces… ¿POR QUÉ Voy a CREERLE A OTRO POLÍTICO ESTA VEZ?

!…Otra pregunta fácil de responder… !  

-Porque quien te habla NO ES UN POLÍTICO, ni busca nada para si… solo es un mediquito PatAgonico desconocido…

¿SI? … ¿QUIEN ERES? … si eres un “DON NADIE” dime.. ¿CÓMO PODEMOS PAGAR ESTA ENORME DEUDA ARGENTINA SIN DESANGRARNOS PAGANDO IMPUESTOS POR 2 GENERACIONES, … NI ROBAR?

¡Fácil! …  SIN ROBAR … pero RECUPERANDO  parte de lo que NOS HAN ROBADO en COMPLICIDAD DE MUCHOS …

¿Vamos a recuperar TODO ESO por la fuerza?

¡NO! … Argentina NUNCA HA SIDO UNA NACIÓN AGRESORA! recuperaremos eso de acuerdo a las Constituciones y las Leyes Argentinas y Norteamericanas … Y  a las Normas Ético Morales Imperante en el planeta hoy en día. . .

¿QUE LEYES, ARGENTINAS ? . . .  ¿Cuáles Artículos de La Constitución Nacional?  ¿Cuáles Leyes Norteamericanas?

ARGENTINA:    Constitución de La Provincia de Rio Negro, Amparo/Habeas corpus Articulo 14)

CONSTITUCIÓN ARGENTINA (Articulo 29)

ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA: FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practice Act) (Traducido es “LEY PARA PRACTICAS CORRUPTAS EXTRANJERAS

ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA (FSIA) que traducido es: LEY PARA INMUNIDADES SOBERANAS EXTRANJERAS

– AHh.. ¿Será eso posible? … ¿Que tenemos que hacer?

UNIRNOS TODOS PARA PRESIONAR AL QUE GANE … y … NO PERMITIRLE QUE PAGUE CON LEYES ARCAICAS (¿COMO DIOS MANDA”?   DIOS NO MANDA ESO! … Argentina NO PUEDE SEGUIR ENGORDANDO LADRONES INTERNACIONALES!!

Unir Criticas … Perdonar Errores, (lo Pasado … Pisado), Lo hecho, hecho está, y no se puede arreglar! Y me estoy refiriendo a AmericA de polo a polo, aquí y allá. Errores de USA… ERRORES de ARGENTINA … Hoy… ¿Que mas da? … ¡Ya bastante hemos sufrido como para agregar penurias pensando en una revancha …

-Pero … ¿Quien va a impulsar todo esto? … ¿Vos? … ¿Un mediquito PatAgonico desconocido?

-NO, yo, ya he hecho lo que estaba a mi alcance “Leer y PENSAR”… Ya les contaré … Hoy ya hay muchos PODEROSOS que ya lo saben…

El Papa Argentino Francisco lo sabe y aceptado … Y ya se lo propuso a CFK …

Cristina Fernández Kirchner ya lo sabe, aceptado y esta actuando… (¿Recuerdan  la nota en BH “ESPECTACULAR GIRO DE LA PRESIDENTE KIRCHNER” )

Mauricio Macri … (aun no lo sabe). Pero es imposible que se pueda negar… 

Obama … lo sabe . . . aceptado …  y ya esta actuando…

La Reina Isabel II (Gran Bretaña) lo sabe, …  lo ha aceptado… y ya esta actuando…

La Reyna Argentina (Máxima Zorreguieta) de Holanda, su esposo el Rey de Holanda lo saben, … lo han aceptado y … ya está actuando toda la familia… aun las nenas…

Y usted: amigo lector … ¿puede oponerse a esto?

Nadie que sepa esto, ningún Argentino, ningun Norteamericano bien nacido pueden oponerse a este plan  …

Ahora VOS TAMBIÉN LO SABES … ¿Que va a hacer … después de estas elecciones?

Dr. Gaston A. Saint Martin

Editor de este blog (gsaintmartin@hotmail.com  

POLITICOS LADRONES

PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

En un solo minuto TODO…

https://www.youtube.com/embed/LPh_b4ulIa0 

ARGENTINA USA 2015.doc

MacBook Pro/documents

________________________

CFK NO SE RENDIRA FACILMENTE 2015 - 2019

( CFK NO SE RENDIRÁ FÁCILMENTE )

____________________________________

KFK IS NOT GOING DOWN WITHOUT A FIGHT 2015

( KFC IS NOT GOING DOWN WITHOUT A FIGHT )

____________________________________

ARGENTINA 1930 even BETTER than USA

( ARGENTINA 1930 BEFORE ANARCHY )

_______________________

Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Memorandum

State of the Union: No Room in the Speech for Latin America

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No Room in the Speech for Latin America  /  Council on Hemispheric Affairs

by COHA Research Associate Becky Walker

New York Times Columnist James Reston once famously said, “The U.S. will do anything for Latin America, except read about it.” Or, evidently, speak about it. In President Obama’s State of the Union address on Tuesday, January 25, he spoke little of the international community, and even less about our southern neighbors. Despite the almost complete lack of direct attention, many of the topics that the president addressed yesterday are likely to gravely affect Latin America. Washington’s policies on higher education, immigration, and free trade will almost certainly reverberate beyond U.S. borders.

During his address, President Obama stressed the importance of reinvigorating America’s floundering education system, and challenged teachers and state policy-makers alike to make vital improvements to the educational infrastructure. Obama mentioned the hundreds of thousands of international students that enroll in American higher education institutions, and expressed his disappointment that the best and brightest will eventually return to their home countries— as if it was the United States that were the primary victim of a heartless brain drain.

For Latin America, this trend toward repatriation of human talent is a positive development—the educated return to aid their home countries and carry with them new skills to put to work for their countries’ welfare. If the U.S. government were to try to entice these well-trained young minds to stay in the U.S., it would only increase the costly brain drain that Latin America already suffers from, thereby further stunting creative and economic growth in the region.

Nevertheless, Obama’s stance on immigration was firm, if not hopeful. He asserted that those who have grown up in America, and pledge no other allegiances, should have the same access to education and economic prosperity as the rest of the population, stating, “[i]t doesn’t make sense that we educate them and then send them away.” Obama pledged that he would address the millions of undocumented workers—the majority of whom are Latin American—yet he did not outline how he would go about definitively tackling the issue. He did, however, emphasize that the United States needs to cease expelling those who could “further enrich the nation.” Ironically, there are foreign students here who have been requested to sign papers in which they pledge to return home once they finish their schooling. Though Obama did not reference the DREAM Act explicitly in the State of the Union Address—probably for political reasons—his comments did reference his commitment to the bill, providing a glimmer of hope for Latinos hoping to stay in the United States.

The reorganization of government agencies that President Obama also called for could eventually affect the relationships that the U.S. has with many of its international allies and partners. Given that there are currently as many as 12 agencies that regulate exports, the consolidation of the offices will likely have an impact on already established agreements and procedures. Though the president mentioned more aggressively pursuing free trade agreements with countries such as Panama and Colombia, he also emphasized that he was advocating such agreements strictly for the promotion of American jobs. For those skeptical about the so-called “mutual benefit” of free trade agreements, this might only further suspicions.

It is unfortunate that President Obama, who is so welcomed by the international community, did not give some of his supporters due justice in his speech. Even though it is understood that the purpose of the State of the Union speech is to address the issues most pressing to American citizens, the nations who over the years have helped this country to achieve its goals should be acknowledged as well. Perpetuating the idea that “America is not just a place on a map, but the light to the world,” could further isolate America. This type of behavior ultimately promotes bloated self-importance rather than a willingness to reach out to forge a lasting relationship with other regional powers. If America really is to be a nation that can live up to the claim that “there isn’t a person here who would trade places with any other nation on earth,” then the U.S. needs to start by setting an example, not of elitism, but of humility. Good fences make good neighbors? We challenge Americans to come up with a better slogan than that.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Becky Walker
Posted 27 Jan 2011
Word Count: 700

Excerpted from State of the Union: No Room in the Speech for Latin America  /  Council on Hemispheric Affairs

http://www.coha.org/state-of-the-union-no-room-in-the-speech-for-latin-america/

==========

 From Senator Mark KIRK

My Website Contact Me Serving Illinois Newsroom

America’s self-imposed oil export ban

Dear Friend,

Yesterday, I voted to end the outdated, self-imposed ban on crude oil exports that puts us at a disadvantage in the global economy.  If enacted, the American Crude Oil Export Equality Act, S. 1372, will allow the United States to counter countries like Iran and Russia, who use oil as a geopolitical tool to influence our allies and manipulate global trade and security policies.

Following the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, the U.S. restricted the export of crude oil. More than 40 years later, the U.S. is the only country in the world with a self-imposed ban on oil exports. In a vote in the Senate Banking Committee, I supported lifting these restrictions to offer our allies an alternative supply of oil, as well as cut the U.S. trade deficit by billions and create thousands of construction and machinery jobs in Illinois.

Rest assured, I will continue to support free trade principles that bolster our national security and grow Illinois’ economy.
Sincerely,

Senator Mark Kirk

Screen shot 2015-10-22 at 8.11.40 PM

Indigent Alabamians who can’t pay traffic tickets or minor fines endure illegal extortion and end up behind bars

 

The decision comes as cities across the state cut ties with the company following SPLC action.

A private, for-profit “probation” company that collects minor fines and fees for municipal courts, often by threatening the poor with jail, is closing its doors in Alabama on Nov. 13, but still faces a racketeering lawsuit filed by the SPLC.

The company, Judicial Correction Services (JCS), sent a letter notifying municipalities that it will be leaving Alabama, according to officials in Anniston and Clayhatchee. Cities across the state have been cutting ties with JCS in increasing numbers since the SPLC filed a lawsuit in March against the company’s operations in Clanton.

“JCS’s decision to leave Alabama is welcome news,” said Sam Brooke, SPLC deputy legal director. “Indigent Alabamians will no longer endure the illegal extortion tactics that seem to be part of the company’s standard procedures.

“It was already clear from the number of cities canceling contracts with JCS that city officials across the state have realized that this company is bad for their communities.”

JCS offers municipal courts its services at no cost to them. People who can’t pay traffic tickets and other minor fines in a lump sum are placed on what is known as “pay-only probation,” and judges assign JCS to collect payments. The company profits from fees it charges – typically $40 a month – to people making payments, prolonging their ordeal and making it more difficult to pay off their debt. Company officials often threaten people with jail to secure payment, and many defendants end up behind bars.

In March, the SPLC filed a federal lawsuit accusing JCS and the city of Clanton of operating an illegal racketeering scheme to extort money from poor residents. The city later canceled its contract with the company as part of a settlement agreement with the SPLC. The claims against JCS are still pending.

The SPLC sent letters to approximately 100 cities that had contracts with JCS, urging them to cancel their contracts. Seventy-two cities have canceled their contracts with JCS, and eight cities have canceled contracts with other private probation companies. A map of municipalities that currently contract with a private probation company or have ended their contract can be viewed here.

An earlier SPLC lawsuit against the city of Montgomery resulted in a settlement agreement in which the city agreed to stop jailing indigent people for their inability to pay fines. The city also decided to not renew its contract with JCS.

 

 

 

 CEO of Whistleblowers Against Fraud 

 

STEVE GRETZ:

IF you are honest, … WHY are you hesitant?

WAF’s CEOs might change! … is it important to YOU?

Your employers might change! … Will YOU change your carrier?

Your HONESTY might change! … Are you going to rent, or sell your Conscious?

Tell yourself the TRUE: Have you seen this?

This might be shocking International news!

WAF REPORTand CONTRACT

Are you ready to answer questions from the Media?

If you say “YES”, I can’t believe you!   You have failed to answer me up to today!

Don’t hesitate any longer! You have only 1 day more, that’s all

Good luck to you Steve

Dr. Gaston A. Saint Martin MD (Sr.)

 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (SSA)

(LINK corto para enviar http://wp.me/p2jyCr-xl )

(Sent to SSA, Senator Harmon and to Senator Dick Durbin)

Julio 23, 2013

INTRODUCTION

This is a very unusual case; It is difficult to explain from Argentina viewpoints, but even is more difficult to be understood from The US points of view; so there are no simple, plain answers as “yes” or “no” to simple questions; that is the need for this long written report!

Perhaps the easy approach to understand Argentina is to use a supposition; (just… a wild supposition!)

Suppose: Chicago’s gangster Al Capone was not incarcerated and defeated by The Law many years ago; and his family and followers by infiltrating complices in key positions control -to day-, all public States and Federal powers: administrative, police; armed forces, The Congress, the Executive included: Sates Supreme Courts and The United States Supreme Court of Justice.

Impossible!… – …Impossible! Do you say? / * First I said, “just suppose…” / * Second: please use you imagination! – They have huge amounts of stolen public money for bribery and corruption and with only a few (well infiltrated) corrupted Justices to rule “that is legally correct..” and an obedient Supreme Court of Justice to confirm all this is Constitutional correct… What can us do individually? – We know what is moral and ethically incorrect… but these “…Infamous Traitors to the Nation…can say:That is legal and Constitutional correct”… So you have to choose between a moral/ethical correct but illegal (criminal) position… OR: take a moral repugnant position that keeps you under the law.

Believe it or not That’s Is The Case in Argentina!  –   In Argentina: The life, honor and wealth of argentines was left to the mercy of an infamous government which have the sum of public power… (Please note: those are no my words but Art. 29 of Argentine Constitution – Details in part II at end of this report)

That was the reason I came back to The US, (as a political refugee) for the second time at 68 age; Well over our Argentine and The USA legal retirement 65 age – We came back using or right to work and to make a living, and to build up by completing a modest small retirement benefits to live with dignity when we won’t be able to work any longer. To work and make a living was our legal right, but we knew it wouldn’t be easy… as I was 68 and I needed about 7 – 8 years more to reach a minimum retirement benefit, we knew it won’t be easy, but we didn’t have other choice! – To get jobs it is illegal to discriminate by sex, age, race, origin, ESL language, religion, and over qualification, but everybody knows that illegal or not it is widely used. It was not easy, but we did it any way; however that benefits may be not enough to afford remain living in The US, specially without getting money from Argentina; but Argentina is ruled by a thief government; which not only steal most of my retirement there, they wont let me bring it here, either take my retirement dollars from here to Argentina.

This report has two parts.   Part I concretely explains, give information and answer question for our SSA retirement application. – Part II: Knowing the information I am given, will hard to belief, specially coming from me, I am giving here quotes, reports, explanations, and practical proposition from unquestioned and well know authorities from The US and from the world; such as are former President of The US George Bush, French Economist Ferdinand Bastias, (Legal Plunder) – Juan Bautista Alberdi (Author of Argentine Constitution, and art 29) and CATO Institute Co- Director and John Hopkins University, applied economy Professor Steve Hanke and his (complete) Report “Legalized Theft” to The US Congress, about Argentine

PART I  

(straightforward reply)

PART II:

For the first time in (about) last 80 years, Argentina had 10 years of economic stability without inflation; it was during the administration of former President Carlos S. Menem.

Hyperinflation = hyper corruption: The previous President, (Raul Alfonsin), was liable for the worst inflation Argentina had. Incompetent President Alfonsin was forced to resign 6 month previous to the end of his presidential mandate. As hyperinflation jumped up out of control (54% during the last month!)

Already Elected President Menem received a received a Country on flames, half of rear early. To control the hyperinflation President Menem called the best inflation management specialist in the world; Applied Economy Professor of John Hopkins University, and Co Director of CATO Institute, Professor Steve Hanke; who develop for Argentina the currency plan: “Peso Convertible” – Argentine Congress fixed the value of the peso convertible è 1 to 1 with The US Dollar (as; 1 peso convertible = 1 USA dollar)

The currency plan worked perfectly during more than 10 years, until by breaking The Rule Of Law, was illegally destroyed by a thief argentine government which pretended devalued the American dollar more than 300% (YES you read well it was no “30 % it was 300%)

We (my wife Emma and me) decided to run away from Argentina and come back to The US, when the “thefts rulers of Argentina” robed us every thing we had. We lost our savings funds (US dollars) my retirement benefits, and my medical radiology practice. I still have my Office’s building and some diagnostic instruments but my patients were excluded from any billing possibilities)

I know it is going to be difficult for the SSA, to understand and to accept my description of the facts that explain why we are here (for a second time in The US) and the difficulties we have to remain here or to go back to Argentina without the integrity of our retirement monthly amount of dollars.

If I say: a criminal band of “INFAMOUS TRAITORS TO THE COUNTRY” it is not an emotional outburst of mine, but are the words of Art. 29, Juan Bautista Alberdi (end note? ) included into the Argentine Constitution (Art. 29 is still current)

Coming from me, It would difficult to accept if I say:

  • Legal Plunder”,
  • Theft government”,
  • The mess in Buenos Aires is nothing short of criminal,
  • People are trying to sneak greenbacks out of the country..
  • “This one was far more than a typical devaluation. It was legalized theft.
  • Argentina’s rulers cannot resurrect an economy by ignoring the rule of law and plundering private
property.

But none of that are my own words but the words of well known international specialists as:

  1. Juan Bautista Alberdi (art 29 of his Argentine Constitution)
  2. Frédéric Bastiat – French Economist (1801-50) “legal plunder
  3. Former President of The US, George Bush’s (His first State of the Union address)
  4. Report to The US Congress (about Argentina economy default)
  5. Steve H. Hanke (professor of applied economics at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore; Co Director of CATO Institute; and Chairman of the Friedberg Mercantile Group, Inc. in New York.

Lets read some of those quotes about Argentina infamous rulers:

  • Juan Bautista Alberdi is the most important Father of Latin American Liberties, he is the Author of The Argentine Constitution; as he knew what was going to happen he included into the Constitution, hard article 29 where he clearly point out what was forbidden to do under no circumstance:

Art.29. Argentina (current) National Constitution:  

Congress can not grant to the National Executive, nor the Provincial Legislatures to Provincial Governors, extraordinary powers nor the sum of public power, neither prerogatives nor special privileges in order to put the life, honor or wealth of argentines to the mercy of government, neither any person whatsoever. Acts of this nature imply absolute nullity, are utterly useless, and condemn to those who formulate, consent or endorse it, the responsibility and punishment of infamous traitors to The Patria.

____________________________________________

 

http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/0304/120.html

United States of Whole America.Wordpress.com

https://usofwa.wordpress.com/2013/03/02/legalized-theft-argentinas-rulers-cannot-resurrect-an-economy-by-ignoring-the-rule-of-law-and-plundering-private-property

Legalized Theft

By Steve H. Hanke  (3/04/2002 @ 12:00AM)

Argentina’s rulers cannot resurrect an economy by ignoring the rule of law and plundering private
property.

The mess in Buenos Aires is nothing short of criminal. Citizens are rioting. The government is blocking depositors from tapping their bank accounts. Commercial banks have been forced to turn over dollars to the central bank. People are trying to sneak greenbacks out of the country.

When President Eduardo Duhalde ended the decade-old currency system, in which the peso and dollar both legally circulated at a 1-to-1 exchange rate, the peso was devalued. Okay, devaluations are one of life’s risks. But this one was far more than a typical devaluation. It was legalized theft.

French economist Frédéric Bastiat (1801-50) defined “legal plunder” as the passing of a law that takes someone’s belongings and gives them to another. Before Duhalde, the central bank’s foreign reserves guaranteed a peso holder’s legal right to freely convert a peso into
a dollar. This strong convertibility feature distinguished Argentina’s setup from the typical fiat money system. Its demise also is distinctive, perversely so.

As part of Duhalde’s Jan. 6 repeal of convertibility, he confiscated $17.8 billion of foreign reserves. Until his action, that was the property of peso holders.

Convertibility’s detractors have a way of blaming Argentina’s problems not on the breakdown of the rule of law but on the strong dollar, which supposedly led to an overvalued peso. This is said to have rendered Argentina uncompetitive, causing the economy to slump and forcing Argentina to default on its debt.

Argentina uncompetitive? Nonsense. If an overvalued currency causes uncompetitiveness, you see declining exports. But Argentina’s exports rose every year in the past decade except 1999, when Brazil, its largest trading partner and a nation without dollar convertibility, suffered its own currency crisis. (Note: The crisis was not that the Brazilian real was too strong.)

Argentinean exports during the first 11 months of 2001 were 3.2% ahead of the same period in 2000. Considering that the real growth in world trade was only an estimated 0.9% last year, Argentina’s export performance was rather strong. Indeed, the export sector has been one of the few bright spots in the Argentinean economy. If the rest of the economy had been growing as fast as the exports during the last two years, Argentina would not be in a recession and the government would not be bankrupt.

Hell-bent on proving that the peso has been overvalued, convertibility’s critics also point to purportedly high prices in Buenos Aires. More nonsense. A recent Union Bank of Switzerland survey of prices in 58 of the world’s largest cities found that, for a basket of 111 goods and services, Buenos Aires ranked 22nd. That’s about midway between the most expensive city, Tokyo, and the least, Bombay.

The biggest lie of all is that the peso devaluation will get the economy going again. Let’s go through the arithmetic. To stimulate Argentina’s exports by 1%, the real value of the peso (adjusted for inflation) would have to depreciate by 10%. Argentinean exports only accounted for one-tenth of gross domestic product last year. This implies that if the current devaluation of 50% doesn’t pass through to any domestic inflation–in short, if the nominal devaluation is a real devaluation–exports will increase by around 5%. Even under these unrealistic assumptions, a 50% devaluation would only add a paltry 0.5% to a collapsed post-devaluation GDP.

Any way you cut this, there was no moral or factual justification for Argentina’s devaluation and nullification of contracts. The Bush Administration should refuse to offer any direct aid and should veto any proposal for the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank to lend money to Argentina. There is a legal basis for refusing a bailout. Title 22, Section 2370 of the U.S. Code provides for suspending U.S. assistance to any country that seizes property owned by U.S. citizens or corporations or nullifies contracts with them. Americans with property in Argentina have been victimized just as much as Argentineans.

If that isn’t enough, listen to President George Bush’s first State of the Union address. “We have no intention of imposing our culture,” Bush said. “But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.”

The U.S. should not tolerate the plundering. It should pressure Argentina’s rulers to restore people’s property and the rule of law.

Steve H. Hanke is a professor of applied economics at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and chairman of the Friedberg Mercantile Group, Inc. in New York. Visit his home page at www.forbes.com/hanke.

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https://usofwa.wordpress.com/2013/07/29/report-to-the-us-congress-about-argentinas-legalized-theft/

Report to The US Congress

By Professor Steve Hanke, (3/5/2002) (www.LEGALIZED THEFT)

 

U.S. House of Representatives

Committee on Financial Services

Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade

5 March 2002

Steve H. Hanke – Professor of Applied Economics

The Johns Hopkins University

Baltimore, Maryland 21218 and

President – Toronto Trust Argentina

Buenos Aires, Argentina (410) 516-7183

hanke@jhu.edu

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to express my views on the causes of and cures for Argentina’s current political-economic crisis. I first became seriously interested in economic reform in Argentina shortly after meeting Argentina’s newly-elected President, Carlos Menem, in 1989. At that time, I concluded that, while stability might not be everything, everything was nothing without stability. To achieve stability, a cure for Argentina’s endemic inflation and unstable money was required. In consultation with some members of Argentina’s Congress, I developed a blueprint for monetary stability during 1990 with a fellow economist, Kurt Schuler. In 1991, our proposal for an orthodox currency board (Banco Central o Caja de Conversión? Buenos Aires: Fundación República) was published. In 1994, I became President of Toronto Trust Argentina (TTA), a balanced mutual fund which can invest in stocks and bonds. TTA has had a good record. Indeed, in 1996, Micropal ranked TTA as the best-performing emerging market mutual fund in the world. In 2000, S&P/Micropal ranked TTA third out of the 169 funds monitored in Latin America for the 1997-2000 period. During 1995-96, I was an advisor to the Minister of Economy, Domingo Cavallo. In 1999, shortly after president Carlos Menem suggested dollarization for Argentina, Kurt Schuler and I wrote a paper explaining how to achieve that goal, step by step. I presented the paper to president Menem in February (“A Dollarization Blueprint for Argentina, ”Friedberg’s Commodity and Currency Comments Experts’ Report, Toronto: Friedberg Commodity Management, Inc., February 1, 1999, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/dollar.pdf). In December 2001, I updated the case for dollarization in two papers, gave talks about dollarization in Argentina and presented my new proposal to Carlos Menem on December 6, 2001 (“Argentine Endgame: Couple Dollarization with Free Banking,” Foreign Policy Briefing No. 67, Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, December 4, 2001http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-067es.html and “How to Dollarize in Argentina Now,” with Kurt Schuler, December 20, 2001, updated January 2, 2002, http://www.cato.org/pubs/papers/schuler-hanke011231.pdf).

All this is simply intended to inform you that I have been interested and involved in Argentine affairs for over a decade, and also to indicate what the nature of that involvement has been.

What Went Wrong in Argentina?

Anyone attempting to make sense out of Argentina’s fall from grace to economic and political chaos faces a real challenge. Most of the commentary has been, at best, confused and confusing.

The road to good health began on April 1, 1991, when Carlos Menem’s government installed what was known locally as a “convertibility system” to rid Argentina of hyperinflation and give the country a confidence shock. Under the Convertibility Law, the peso and the U.S. dollar both circulated legally at a 1-to-1 exchange rate. The owner of a peso had a property right in a dollar and could freely exercise that right by converting a peso into a dollar. That redemption pledge was credible because the central bank was required by law to hold foreign reserves to fully cover its peso liabilities.

With the passage of the Law of Public Emergency and Reform of the Exchange Rate Regime on January 6, 2002, near-dictatorial powers were conferred upon President Eduardo Duhalde and the convertibility system was swept into the dustbin. The peso was floated and is currently worth less than half of its former value.

The confusing commentary about Argentina centers on its rather unusual monetary regime, which although popular with the Argentine public, was not well understood by most economists, many currency speculators, or the International Monetary Fund.

Because the convertibility system was not well understood, it has been blamed for a number of Argentina’s ills that either had little to do with convertibility or simply did not exist. The convertibility system was the linchpin for a decade of stable prices and a solid export and economic growth performance. The price level at the end of 2001 was about where it was in 1994. Exports grew each full year of the convertibility system, with the exception of 1999. And the real GDP growth rate during the decade of convertibility was greater than any other decade since World War II.

Argentina’s monetary system from April 1, 1991 to January 6, 2002 was known locally as convertibility. It was an unusual name for an unusual system. The convertibility system was not an orthodox currency board. Rather, it was a currency board-like system: a mixture of currency board and central banking features. In writings dating back to 1991, I proposed that Argentina establish an orthodox currency board and criticized convertibility as an unstable, mixed system.

Was Argentina’s monetary system an orthodox currency board?

The three defining features of an orthodox currency board are:

a fixed exchange rate with its anchor currency,

unrestricted convertibility into and out of the anchor currency at the fixed rate, and

net reserves of 100 percent or slightly more of the board’s monetary liabilities, held in foreign assets only.

Together, these three features imply that an orthodox currency board is a narrowly focused, rule-bound institution. In particular, an orthodox currency board lacks the power to conduct sterilized intervention, does not lend to the government, does not regulate commercial banks, and does not act as an official or unofficial lender of last resort.

The convertibility system lacked one or more of the defining features of an orthodox currency board throughout its lifetime. Last year, when the convertibility system began encountering severe problems, the government fiddled with the exchange rate and restricted convertibility. Throughout the lifetime of the convertibility system, the Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA)—note that it was never officially renamed a currency board—held extensive domestic assets in addition to its foreign assets. The BCRA was initially allowed to hold true foreign reserves of as little as 66-2/3 percent of its monetary liabilities. It was allowed to hold the difference between its true foreign reserves and 100 percent in the form of Argentine government bonds denominated in foreign currency, valued at market prices. Later, the minimum ratio was raised to 90 percent, although the BCRA was allowed to breach that floor temporarily, which it did on a number of occasions, most recently from July 25 to September 7, 2001 and from December 12, 2001 until the convertibility system ended on January 6, 2002.

The BCRA was never subject to any maximum ratio of foreign reserves. In contrast, if an orthodox currency board holds reserves beyond 100 percent of its monetary liabilities, the purpose is to merely provide a small cushion to prevent reserves from falling below 100 percent. Many currency boards have held supplementary reserves of 5 or 10 percent to guard against losses, but they have not used their supplementary reserves to conduct discretionary monetary policy and have remitted to their owners all surpluses beyond what was necessary to maintain the core and supplementary reserves. Over the course of 2001, the BCRA had a ratio of true foreign reserves to monetary liabilities that varied from a high of 193 percent on February 23 to a low of 82 percent at year-end. The BCRA gained foreign reserves through the IMF loan of September 7. It lost foreign reserves by lending to commercial banks and indirectly supporting the market for government bonds, since government bonds were used as collateral for many loans.

The holding of domestic assets and the varying of the ratio of foreign reserves to monetary liabilities meant that the BCRA engaged extensively in a discretionary policy of sterilized intervention, which an orthodox currency board does not do. The problem with sterilized intervention is that it forces a monetary authority to attempt to hit simultaneously two possibly incompatible targets—an exchange-rate target and a money-supply target. The convertibility system thus eventually encountered the problem common to all pegged exchange rates: which target to hit when the two came into conflict. Argentina chose the money-supply target, which involved giving up the exchange-rate target.

Under the convertibility system the BCRA also retained the power to regulate banks, such as by setting reserve ratios. It was unofficially a lender of last resort, though it retained a constructive ambiguity about its role that reduced moral hazard risk.

As evidence of the BCRA’s hyperactivity, one has to only look at the Bulletin of Monetary and Fiscal Affairs published quarterly by the BCRA. Each issue since April 1991 contained a long list of measures taken by the BCRA. If the BCRA had been operating as an orthodox currency board, these pages would have been blank.

In a 1993 book, Russian Currency and Finance, which I co-authored with Lars Jonung and Kurt Schuler, we predicted that Argentina’s monetary system would eventually behave more like a typical central bank than an orthodox currency board. After a longer delay than we ever expected, we were proved correct. Moral: An unorthodox, currency board-like system is an internally contradictory mixture of currency board and central banking elements. An orthodox currency board system is internally consistent and therefore does not encounter the same problems.

The original convertibility system began to crack in April 2001, when Domingo Cavallo, who had been recently appointed minister of the economy, sent a bill to Argentina’s Congress to change the peso’s anchor from the dollar to a 50-50 basket of the dollar and the euro. As economy minister in 1991, when the convertibility system was established, Cavallo had considered but rejected a similar idea. Also in April, Pedro Pou, the independent-minded president of the central bank who preferred dollarization to devaluation, was ousted on a pretext in favor of the more pliable Roque Maccarone.

Was the original convertibility system in effect until January 6?

By June the original convertibility system was definitively finished. Congress approved changing the exchange rate link if and when the euro ever appreciated to one per dollar. More importantly, Cavallo announced a preferential exchange rate for exports—a dual exchange rate. This was contrary both to the intent of the original convertibility system and of an orthodox currency board. Cavallo’s measures showed that the government was quite willing to tamper with the convertibility system. In previous episodes when confidence in the peso declined, the government had responded, sometimes after an agonizing delay, by reaffirming the link to the dollar and the commitment to a single exchange rate. By removing the cornerstones of the convertibility system, Cavallo left the edifice shaky.

By meddling with the convertibility system, Cavallo tightened monetary conditions. Indeed, peso interest rates shot up and remained at punishingly high levels until peso interest rate caps were imposed in December 2001.

In December 2001 the government imposed a freeze on bank deposits. It was the last straw. Angry Argentines remembered how high inflation during similar freezes in 1982 (engineered by Cavallo) and 1989 had robbed them of the real value of their savings. Cavallo and president Fernando de la Rúa resigned in the face of widespread protests.

There was another way out: official dollarization, which would have eliminated questions about confidence in the peso by eliminating the peso itself. Unfortunately, a lack of resolve by the Argentine government and a lack of support from the U.S. government prevented this economically beneficial, but politically somewhat difficult, option from being implemented either when president Menem first proposed it in 1999 or subsequently. Instead, Argentina temporized and eventually suffered both a currency crisis and a political crisis.

Many people assert that the crux of the Argentine crisis was an overvalued peso. Supposedly, the peso’s link to the strong US dollar made the peso overvalued, rendering Argentina uncompetitive, causing the economy to slump, and forcing the government to default.

Moral: When a currency board-like system faces a crisis caused by lack of confidence in the currency, a “hard” exit, for example via dollarization, is preferable to the “soft” exits of devaluation or floating.

Was the peso overvalued?

Does the story withstand examination? A classic sign of uncompetitiveness caused by an overvalued currency is declining exports. But Argentina’s exports increased every full year of the convertibility system except 1999, when Brazil, its largest trading partner, suffered a currency crisis. Exports during the first 11 months of 2001 were 3.2% ahead of the same period in 2000. Considering that estimated real growth in world trade was only 0.9% last year, Argentina’s export performance was relatively strong. Indeed, the export sector has been one of the few bright spots in the Argentine economy. If the rest of the economy had been growing as fast as the export sector during the last two years, Argentina would not be in a recession.

In an attempt to bolster claims that the peso was highly overvalued under the convertibility system, some observers asserted, on the basis of taxi rides from the airport or other casual impressions, that prices were high in Buenos Aires, and that high prices were evidence the peso was significantly overvalued against the dollar. A recent Union Bank of Switzerland survey of prices in 58 of the world’s largest cities found that for a basket of 111 goods and services, weighted by typical consumer habits—including three categories of house rent—Buenos Aires ranked 22nd, about midway between the most expensive city, Tokyo, and the least expensive, Bombay. The survey also found those taxi rides that were allegedly so expensive cost about 8% less than in Rio de Janeiro.

There are other indicators that contradict the overvaluation story. For example, the Economist magazine’s Big Mac Index, which compares the price of McDonald’s hamburgers around the world, indicates that the peso, before its devaluation, was 2% undervalued. In 1999 the index had indicated that the peso was 3% overvalued and in 2000 it had indicated no overvaluation. Even so, from May 15, 1999 through February 2, 2002, the Economist contained twenty-six articles claiming that the economy was being dragged down by an overvalued peso. And although the Big Mac index, as well as more sophisticated estimates of equilibrium exchange rates, should be treated with great skepticism, a recent careful study of the matter using data from 1993 to 1999 indicates that the peso was always within 6% of its so-called fundamental equilibrium real exchange rate (Kalin Hristov, “FEER and Currency Boards: Evidence from the 90’s,” unpublished manuscript, Bulgarian National Bank, presented at the Centre for Central Banking Studies (Bank of England) Conference on Exchange Rates, November 26, 2001, p. 25).

Moral: Look carefully at the evidence before claiming that a currency is overvalued. For better or worse, devaluation is now a fact. The big question going forward is: Will it revive the economy? Let’s go through the arithmetic. The short-run price elasticity for Argentine exports is about -0.1. So, to stimulate exports by 1%, the real value of the peso (adjusted for inflation) would have to depreciate by 10%. Exports in Argentina only accounted for 9% of GDP last year. Consequently, if the current devaluation of 50% (the floating peso is trading at about two to the dollar) doesn’t pass through to any domestic inflation—in short, if the nominal devaluation is a real devaluation—exports will increase by about 5%. Under this optimistic scenario, the current level of devaluation would add less than a half percent to GDP—a GDP that, thanks to the new exchange-rate regime, has collapsed. And even though estimates of price elasticity cannot be treated with very high confidence, the short-run price elasticity for exports would have to be about ten times as great as its estimated value to offset the 5% officially-projected contraction in GDP this year. If you use private-sector forecasts of the Argentina’s contraction in GDP for 2002 (which are much more pessimistic and realistic than the official estimate), the elasticity would have to be even greater.

Will the devaluation restart the economy?

Moral: When considering a regime shift, use the back of an envelope and make a few calculations. The Convertibility Law gave a peso holder the right to convert a peso into a US dollar. That redemption pledge was made credible because the central bank was required by law to hold foreign reserves to fully cover its peso liabilities. It was this redemption pledge that made the convertibility set up unique and distinguished it from the typical fiat money system.

Why was Argentina’s devaluation unique?

With the repeal of the Convertibility Law, the redemption pledge was thrown to the wind and the peso holders’ claims on foreign reserves held at the central bank were revoked. Argentina’s devaluation, then, represented more—much more—than a garden-variety devaluation. It was a great bank robbery. Foreign reserves equal to 17.8 billion dollarsthat were the property of peso holders were confiscated by the government.

That was just the beginning. In addition to taking the foreign reserves from people who held pesos, the government of Eduardo Duhalde has passed other laws and issued regulations to pesofy the economy. These have annulled property rights and ignored the rule of law. The Congress acquiesced in the government’s actions by approving the Law of Public Emergency and Reform of the Exchange Rate Regime on January 6, 2002. The law transfers extraordinary powers to the President and allows him to, in effect, rule by decree for two years (when his term is scheduled to end).

Argentina’s economy went into recession in September 1998 in the aftermath of the Asian and Russian currency crises, which resulted in a general decline in flows of investment to emerging market economies. The Brazilian currency crisis of 1999 dealt the economy another blow. Signs of recovery appeared in late 1999 and early 2000, but the incoming de la Rúa government choked the recovery by enacting large tax increases that took effect at the start of 2000. The government (and the IMF, which lent support to the government’s program) thought the tax increases were necessary to reduce the budget deficit. Instead, tax collections fell. When Domingo Cavallo became minister of the economy in March 2001, he pushed through a financial transaction tax, which was increased in August to its current rate of 0.6 percent on bank debits and credits. Although the tax rate may appear low, it is not.

Moral: In a country that fails to adhere to the rule of law, the domestic currency should be replaced with a foreign currency produced in a country that embraces the rule of law.

So, then, what caused Argentina’s crisis?

The tax increases added to the already heavy tax burden Argentines bear if they are part of the legal economy. Tax evasion is high in Argentina because the tax savings from going into the underground economy are huge. The value-added tax is 21 percent; social security and medical care taxes are 31.9 percent; and the top income tax rate of 35 percent starts at 102,300 pesos—currently less than 50,000 dollars. Compare these with US state sales taxes of 0-9 percent (there is no federal tax); Social Security and Medicare taxes of 15.3 percent; and a top federal tax rate of 38.6 percent starting at about 300,000 dollars (plus state taxes of 0-11 percent). Unlike Argentina, the United States does not tax bank credits and debits at all.

The distortions created by Argentina’s sky-high tax rates show up in the labor markets. For example, the tax wedge between gross labor costs and net wages is 42%, comparable to the largest wedges in Europe and almost double that of the U.S. It is not surprising, therefore, that the unemployment rate is relatively high and the underground economy is so vibrant.

It is also not surprising that tax revenue fell as higher tax rates aggravated the recession. Falling tax revenue made the government’s debt more precarious. Particularly after Domingo Cavallo’s changes to the convertibility system, concern about the consequences of a debt default spilled over into the currency market. Forward rates reflected an expected devaluation of the peso, and interest rates in pesos shot up to 40-60 percent. Concern about the consequences of a default also spilled over into the banking system, reflected by withdrawals of deposits and interest rates in dollars of 20-30 percent. (Most bank deposits and loans were, in fact, in dollars rather than pesos.) People feared that the government would not let the default remain compartmentalized as a problem of government finance, but would make it spill over into the rest of the economy.

Again, dollarization would have helped contain the problem, by depriving the government of a national currency as a tool for devaluation and inflation. Dollarization would not have guaranteed success—no monetary system can—but it would have improved the chances for success. It still would help today. Moral: During a recession, avoid raising tax rates and don’t “tighten” monetary conditions by meddling with monetary institutions.

The IMF’s Role in Argentina’s Crisis

During the boom years, 1990-94, when Argentina’s per capita GDP measured in dollars grew by 72.8%, the IMF played a minor role in Argentina’s economic affairs. Argentina implemented the convertibility system without the IMF’s aid or advice. Following the Mexican devaluation of December 1994, Argentina suffered a crisis of investor confidence, which it overcame by enacting policies that included a reaffirmation of its commitment to an exchange rate of 1 peso per dollar. The IMF lent Argentina funds to support these policies, and ever since has been heavily involved in Argentina. Unfortunately, the IMF threw cold water on President Menem’s dollarization proposal in early 1999. As a result, Argentina was forced to forego a much-needed positive confidence shock. When Fernando de la Rúa became president in December 1999, things went from bad to worse. His administration’s new economic plan, approved by the IMF, was supposed to lower interest rates and produce a boom by raising taxes, which was meant to reduce the government’s deficit. Its timing was awful. World interest rates in December 1999 were on the rise, so Argentina’s rates also roseand the economy slumped further into recession. Argentina was headed for a crisis of confidence, one that would plunge the economy into a deeper recession and cause debt-servicing problems. The rest is history, almost.

From there the de la Rúa administration would commit a steady stream of policy errors that would undermine the successful reforms of the early 1990s: stable money and sound banking. And during this period, the IMF stood by silently and at the same time extended more credit to Argentina.

Then, during the early days of the Duhalde government, the IMF again threw cold water on the dollarization idea. When asked about dollarization for Argentina during a press briefing on January 11, Anne Krueger, first deputy managing director of the IMF, said: “Well, my understanding at the moment is that [dollarization] is technically unfeasible. So I don’t think the authorities are thinking about it; I don’t think we are thinking about it.”

Dr. Krueger’s statement implies that the BCRA did not have enough foreign reserves to liquidate its peso monetary liabilities and dollarize the economy. According to the BCRA’s balance sheet of January 10, this was not the case, however. The BCRA’s peso monetary liabilities were 17.92 billion pesos and “pure” foreign reserves in US dollars were $14.75 billion. In addition, the BCRA had 14.96 billion pesos of domestic assets valued at market prices that could be sold to acquire U.S. dollars. Consequently, at the time Dr. Krueger made her statement, it would have been feasible for Argentina to dollarize at an exchange rate of 1 peso to 1 U.S. dollar, the rate in force under the Convertibility Law.

This, of course, leads to a number of questions. Was Dr. Krueger misinformed? Or does the IMF know something that the rest of us don’t know? In short, does the BCRA have an “Enron problem”? Either way, the IMF does not look good.

The IMF didn’t look good in Indonesia, either. When I was operating as President Suharto’s advisor in early 1998, I had recommended a currency board for Indonesia, something Suharto agreed to. The IMF went very public with an anti-currency board campaign. Part of the IMF’s attack centered on the claim that I had supposedly recommended a rupiah-dollar exchange rate of 5,000, and at that rate, the IMF concluded that the Bank of Indonesia didn’t have adequate reserves to set up a currency board.

The problem with this IMF story is that it was entirely fabricated. I did not specify a rupiah-dollar exchange rate of 5,000. Indeed, I made that clear at the time (“Voice of Suharto’s Guru,” International Herald Tribune, March 20, 1998) and have done so in many articles since.

That hasn’t stopped the IMF from rewriting monetary history in an attempt to cover up its blunders. For example, the IMF issued a 139-page working paper about Indonesia in May 2001. It was authored by Charles Enoch, Barbara Baldwin, Oliver Frécaut and Arto Kovanen, and titled, “Indonesia: Anatomy of a Banking Crisis: Two Years of Living Dangerously, 1997-99.” The authors include a largely fictive three-page account of the currency board episode. The authors assert, among other things, that I counseled President Suharto to set the rupiah-dollar exchange rate at 5,000. Not surprisingly, this account, which includes 115 footnotes, fails to document that assertion. Lies are impossible to document.

What Should the U.S. Role Be In Argentina?

The Duhalde government’s measures, especially those connected with the exchange rate and the banking system, have drawn praise from many observers as steps in the right direction. The observers are wrong. They neglect that the government’s program amounts to destruction of the rule of law, to the imperfect extent that it existed in Argentina. The government has changed the terms of some contracts between private parties, suspended the validity of other contracts, and seized wealth from some members of the public to redistribute to other members or to itself.

The Duhalde government has so disrupted rights to private property that they hardly exist any more. The government’s measures are disastrous for Argentina’s future. Without a reversal of most of the measures, Argentina will remain for years to come what it has been for more than half a century: a once-rich country that has stagnated while other countries, once poorer, surged ahead of it. If private property has no stability, there will be no reason for Argentines or foreigners to invest much in Argentina.

Observers who have praised the government’s measures have also somehow failed to notice that a depreciating peso, which is the only kind Argentina is likely to get, is massively unpopular. Since central banking was established in Argentina in 1935, the peso has depreciated against the dollar by a factor of approximately 6,000,000,000,000. In the Argentine context, a floating exchange rate has always meant a depreciating rate. The convertibility system, though imperfect, was the cornerstone of Argentina’s economic growth in the 1990s. Now that the cornerstone has been removed, much of the structure has already crumbled.

At a hearing of this subcommittee on February 6, 2002, John Taylor, the Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, remarked that he thought Argentina should have dollarized rather than frozen bank deposits on December 1. To me, it is astonishing that he did not communicate this view to Argentina’s government, since it would have carried considerable weight. Although the United States is not responsible for Argentina’s economic problems, it is in our national interest for the Treasury Department to offer advice that would promote economic growth and political stability in Argentina. The result of the Treasury’s hesitant attitude about recommending dollarization has been that Argentina is now asking the IMF and other international financial institutions for billions of dollars in new loans. Since the United States is the largest provider of funds to those organizations, if they lend to Argentina at their customary below-market rates, U.S. taxpayers will in effect be paying for the Treasury’s hesitation. This leads me to my two recommendations for U.S. policy towards Argentina.

First, recommend dollarization. As a purely technical matter,dollarization is always feasible at some exchange rate, and as Ecuador’s experience of dollarization in 2000 indicates, it is feasible even when established in the midst of political and economic chaos. The question in Argentina’s case is what exchange rate is appropriate now and, if dollarization is not adopted soon, how to determine the exchange rate that would be appropriate should a future government decide to dollarize. Dollarization remains desirable because the prospects are poor for making the peso into a stable currency that people will want to use without coercion. People trust the dollar; they do not trust the peso.

It may no longer be possible to return to an exchange rate of 1 peso per dollar, but Argentina can do what Ecuador did when it dollarized in 2000: establish a uniform exchange rate for converting local currency into dollars and apply it to all assets and liabilities denominated in local currency. This rate should not be determined mechanically, by simply looking at what exchange rate would be necessary to make the central bank’s dollar assets cover its peso monetary liabilities. The confidence that dollarization would inspire might enable dollarization to occur at an exchange rate considerably more favorable for the Argentine public than a mechanical calculation indicates.

Interest rates in pesos are far above rates in dollars because of expectations of substantial inflation. They can be adjusted as they were in Ecuador by establishing procedures for reducing nominal interest rates downward to reflect lower expectations of inflation.

My second recommendation is that the Treasury respect laws that Congress has passed, which establish the wise principle that Americans as taxpayers should not support a government that robs Americans as investors. A number of provisions of Title 22 of the U.S. Code state that the President shall deny foreign aid to governments that seize the property of or nullify contracts with U.S. citizens or corporations. These provisions also state that the President shall instruct U.S. executive directors at international financial institutions to vote against loans (except humanitarian aid loans) for such governments unless the governments have, within a specified period, provided compensation for the property taken or submitted claims for compensation to arbitration in accord with international law. The relevant provisions of Title 22 include sections 283r; section 284j; section 2370, subsection (e); and section 2370a, subsections (a) and (b).

In my view, the actions Argentina has taken should clearly trigger U.S. opposition to loans by international financial institutions to which the United States belongs. In testimony to the Joint Economic Committee on February 14, 2002, Dr. Taylor indicated that Argentina’s actions have not triggered the provisions of Title 22 because Argentina has treated all foreign investors equally. That is not the standard the provisions refer to, however; rather, the provisions are supposed to be triggered by specified violations of property rights that affect Americans whether or not other foreign investors have suffered similar violations. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, whether the administration will enforce the laws Congress has passed depends mainly on you and your fellow legislators. If American as taxpayers end up supporting a government that has robbed them as investors in Argentina, it will send a terrible signal. Secure private property rights are an essential ingredient of our prosperity and that of every other wealthy country. To turn a blind eye to the massive violations of property rights in Argentina would not only harm U.S. investors, it would reinforce longstanding tendencies that have made Argentina a problem-prone country for most of its history. Therefore I urge you to ensure that the laws are upheld and that the United States vote against aid for Argentina from the IMF and other institutions until Argentina reverses its seizures of property or provides compensation for them.

 

 

 

 

 

 

SPLC NEEDS OUR HELP

FIGHTING HATE // TEACHING TOLERANCE // SEEKING JUSTICE

OCTOBER 12, 2015
Morris Dees Photo
Morris Dees
Founder

Very soon there will be no Southern Poverty Law Center, and there will be no Morris Dees. He will be dead soon.”

— Threat to SPLC, August 11, 2015

Dear Gaston,

My colleagues and I are facing serious threats to our lives and hope we can count on you to help keep us safe.

On numerous occasions, the names, pictures, and home addresses of people who work here have been posted on hate websites frequented by violent extremists.

At one point recently, the threat level was so high that staff members and their families actually had to leave their homes.

I’ve long ago accepted the fact that my life’s work puts me in the crosshairs of hate.

But I feel an enormous obligation to do everything I can to protect my colleagues who also put their lives on the line.

Today I ask that you join me today in sending a special gift to help pay for the 24/7 security that we need. It’s an investment not only in the safety of our staff but also in the future of our work.

Help Me Keep My SPLC Colleagues Safe from Violent Extremists

As you know, racist threats are nothing new to us. Klansmen firebombed our first office in retaliation for a lawsuit we filed — and more than two dozen extremists have gone to jail in connection with plots to kill me or attack the SPLC.

A recent threat assessment by a global security analyst said extremists “will never cease to represent a threat” to the SPLC and our staff.

But I can assure you that we won’t be intimidated.

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Short Link: http://wp.me/p2jyCr-y2

MARK KIRK, AGAINST AGE DISCRIMINATION

Comment from Dr. Gastón Saint Martin MD (Editor of this Blog):   Dear Senator Mark Kirk: Please read my (year 2010) letter to Jacqueline Berrien Chair of EEOC (EQUAL Employment Opportunity Commission Senate (http://wp.me/p2jyBb-Gx) … about  http://wp.me/p2jyCr-y6  . Don’t you think we have lost a lot of time because we didn’t meet 5 years ago? … I am trying to contact you (STAT or ASAP) now (Sunday, October 18, 2015) (gsaintmartin@hotmail.com – (708) 763 9292 Chicago)

 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISION)   (http://wp.me/p2jyBb-Gx )

MARK KIRK US SENATOR 4 IL

Mark Kirk and Bob Casey Introduce Bill to Protect Against Age Discrimination in the Workplace

Abajo para Ver leer en Español

Mark Kirk | Senator for Illinois

Friday, Oct 9, 2015

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Bob Casey (D-Pa.) this week introduced the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act (POWADA), which would overturn a Supreme Court decision that created a high bar for workers seeking to bring workplace age discrimination claims. The bill essentially reverses Gross v. FBL Financial and amends the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and other major civil rights laws to specify that workers only must prove that discrimination is a motivating factor, rather than the decisive factor, in an adverse employment decision.

Senators Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Susan Collins (R-Maine), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Chris Coons (D-Del.) are also original co-sponsors of the legislation.

“All Americans should be free from discrimination of any kind, whether it be based on age, religion, race, sex or origin,” said Senator Kirk. “Those suffering from abuse at the workplace shouldn’t feel burdened by the law that is supposed to be helping them. I look forward to working with my colleague Senator Casey to pass this bill so all American workers are protected from age discrimination.”

“This legislation fights to protect vulnerable workers for whom proving discrimination is already difficult,” said Senator Casey.  “I am confident we can move this bill through Congress and continue to defend and meet the needs of older Americans not only in Pennsylvania, but across the entire country.”

POWADA would help to restore legal protections for vulnerable workers to what they were before the Gross decision. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly approved “mixed motive” claims in which plaintiffs need only prove discrimination is a motivating, even if not the determinative, factor in an adverse employment decision. Nonetheless, in Gross, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had to prove age was the deciding, or “but for”, factor in such a decision. POWADA would reinstate the “mixed motive” burden of proof and apply it to discrimination and retaliation claims brought under other major federal laws.

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En Castellano (Spanish)

WASHINGTON –

Los senadores Marcos Kirk (.-R III) y Bob Casey (. D-Pa) esta semana introdujo la protección de Ley de Discriminación por los trabajadores de edad contra (POWADA), lo que revocar una decisión del Tribunal Supremo que creó el listón muy alto para los trabajadores que buscan para traer el lugar de trabajo las demandas por discriminación de edad. El proyecto de ley esencialmente invierte v Bruto. FBL Financiera y modifica la Discriminación por Edad en el Empleo de 1967 y otras leyes importantes de derechos civiles para especificar que los trabajadores sólo deben demostrar que la discriminación es un factor de motivación, más que el factor decisivo, en una decisión adversa del empleo .

Los senadores Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Susan Collins (R-Maine), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) Y Chris Coons (D-Del.) También son co-patrocinadores originales de la legislación.

“Todos los estadounidenses deberían estar libres de cualquier tipo de discriminación, ya sea que se base en la edad, la religión, la raza, el sexo o el origen”, dijo el senador Kirk. “Los que sufren de abusos en el lugar de trabajo no debe sentirse agobiado por la ley que se supone que es ayudarles. Espero con interés trabajar con mi colega el senador Casey para aprobar este proyecto de ley para que todos los trabajadores estadounidenses están protegidos de la discriminación por edad “.

“Esta legislación lucha para proteger a los trabajadores vulnerables para los cuales la discriminación proving es ya difícil”, dijo el senador Casey. “Estoy seguro de que podemos mover este proyecto de ley en el Congreso y seguir defendiendo y satisfacer las necesidades de las personas de edad avanzada no sólo en Pennsylvania, pero a través de todo el país.”

POWADA ayudaría a restaurar la protección legal para los trabajadores vulnerables a lo que eran antes de la decisión Bruto. La Ley de Derechos Civiles de 1964 reclamaciones aprobadas expresamente “motivo mixto” en el que los demandantes sólo tienen que probar la discriminación es un motivador, incluso si no es el determinante, el factor en una decisión adversa del empleo. No obstante, en bruto, la Corte Suprema sostuvo que los demandantes tenían que probar la edad fue la de decidir, o “no ser por”, factor en esa decisión. POWADA sería restablecer la carga “motivo mixto” de la prueba y aplicarlo a la discriminación y las represalias reclamaciones entabladas en virtud de otras leyes federales importantes.

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